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THE UNINTENDED IMPACTS OF
ANTI-REDLINING LEGISLATION

RISA PALM
JAMES CORBRIDGE
University of Colorado, Boulder

ABSTRACT

Federal and state legislation intended to curb the practice of geographic loan
discrimination or redlining may have the unintended and undesirable effect of
preventing mortgage originators from using environmental characteristics as
criteria in lending evaluations. Since the California fault rupture zones (special
studies zones) do not contain systematic concentrations of poor, black, or elderly
households, they should be targets for differential lending policies, such as
mandatory earthquake insurance or structural reinforcements as conditions for
mortgage loans. A clarification of the wording of the Housing Financial
Discrimination Act is needed to alleviate some of the present potentially damaging
effects of failing to discourage residential investment in surface fault rupture zones.

Redlining is a form of geographic discrimination in lending. The term refers to
the refusal to grant mortgage loans to otherwise qualified buyers for sound
property in certain areas of the city [1]. "Redlining" was an early practice of
the Home Owners Loan Corporation: maps were color coded to represent
relative risks to lenders, with "hazardous" zones coded as red [2]. The decision
that a neighborhood is a poor risk for mortgage loans has been based on several
factors, including large numbers of renter-occupiers, changing racial composition,
or visible signs of property deterioration [3]. This conservative lending policy
has been justified on the argument that banks and saving and loans have a
fiduciary responsibility to their investors to protect their savings from undue
investment risk.
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Two significant objections have been raised to redlining. First, it is claimed
that disinvestment policies contribute to the further deterioration of the
neighborhoods on which they are imposed. As less and less new capital is
available for construction or improvements in these areas, a continuing decline
in values sets in. Second, the neighborhoods to which redlining is applied are
often inhabited by racial minorities at the lower end of the income scale. By
imposing arbitrary mortgage lending restrictions on these homeowners, redlining
results in racial discrimination, whether or not garbed as good business practice.
In an effort to curb the perceived discriminatory effects of redlining, remedial
legislation has been enacted by the Congress and by several of the state
legislatures. The federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 requires a wide
variety of lending institutions with assets of $ 10,000,000 or more and making
"federally related mortgage loans" to make available, for public inspection,
information on the number of average terms of home mortgages originated or
purchased by that institution (12 U.S.C. #2801 ff.). The stated purpose of
this legislation is to "provide the citizens and public officials of the United
States with sufficient information to enable them to determine whether
depository institutions are fulfilling their obligations to serve the housing needs
of the communities and neighborhoods in which they are located" (12 U.S.C.
2801 (b) ). Presumably, informed depositors would not do business with
lenders who were not "fulfilling their obligations." In addition, the practice of
redlining is affected by the provisions of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C.
#3601 ff.) and the regulations issued under it (12 C.F.R. ##528.2 (a), 531.8
(1981) ), which prohibit discriminatory lending practices. In 1976 a federal
district court specifically upheld the application of the Act to redlining by a
building and loan association which was a member of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board System. (Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 409 F.Supp. 489
(1976).) The District of Columbia and five states, all of which have heavy urban
concentrations, have passed legislation specifically aimed at controlling the
racially discriminatory effects of redlining and the problems of disinvestment in
particular urban neighborhoods.
While the purposes of these federal and state laws are laudable, it can be
argued that such legislation also may have unintended and undesirable impacts.
In particular, such laws seem to prevent mortgage originators from using
environmental characteristics as criteria in lending evaluations, even when such
use would benefit prospective homebuyers and society as a whole. This paper
will demonstrate the dilemma of these unintended consequences.

ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS
Environmental hazards of one kind or another affect virtually every part of
the United States [4]. Because some natural hazards threaten large areas and
are not particularly place-specific, their effects cannot be mitigated through
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simple residential relocation. Examples are tornadoes and severe winter storms.
Other natural hazards are relatively fixed in place, based on geologic or
hydrologie conditions, and are amenable to avoidance by careful control of the
location of residential housing units. Among these latter hazards are storm
surge susceptibility, earthquake-related surface fault rupture, landslide potential,
and riverine flooding. It is these place-specific hazards whose effects may be
mitigated by regulating the process of home mortgage lending.
Mortgage lending policies have already been regulated to acknowledge the
location of flood potential. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) presently require member
banks to obtain from borrowers, before the loan is closed, "written acknowledge
ment that the borrower realizes the property securing the loan is or will be
located in an area identified as a flood hazard area and the borrower has received
the required notice regarding the Federal disaster relief assistance" (12 C.F.R.
#339.6(a); 12 C.F.R. #523.29(e) (1981)). In addition, under FDIC regulations,
"no bank shall make, increase, extend, or renew any loan"'on improved real
estate or a mobile home "located or to be located in an area that has been
identified by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency as an
area having special flood hazards" unless the building or mobile home and any
personal property securing the loan is covered for the term of the loan by flood
insurance." (12 CF. R. ##339.2, 339.3 (1981)). This seems to be an effective
way to ensure that homebuyers are made aware of the possibility of flooding to
their property and, through the purchase of subsidized flood insurance, to pay
at least part of the costs involved in rebuilding and recovery associated with the
inevitable flood.
Earthquake hazards are not included in this disclosure and insurance program.
Although the homeowner may purchase nonsubsidized earthquake insurance,
there are no programs available which subsidize the costs of such insurance, or
encourage, let alone require, its purchase. Acquisition of such coverage is left
to the homeowner, and there are few economic incentives for an insurance
agent to promote earthquake insurance along with the required fire insurance
coverage [5]. As a result, only a minority of homeowners in areas particularly
susceptible to earthquake damage have even inquired about earthquake insurance
and even fewer have purchased it [6, 7].
To protect their investment in properties particularly susceptible to surface
fault rupture, home mortgage originators might require the purchase of
eatthquake insurance as a condition for granting a loan, or might use other
methods, such as higher front-end points, higher interest rates, or outright
refusal to lend, to protect their business interests. Although such requirements,
including the mandatory purchase of earthquake insurance, would place an
additional financial burden on the homebuyer, they would both inform the
purchaser about the environmental hazards associated with the particular housing
site, and would require the homeowner to bear part of the recovery costs
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associated with surface fault rupture, much as the flood insurance program has
done with riverine flooding. However, in the absence of federal legislation
directing mortgage lenders to require the purchase of earthquake insurance, or
permitting other means of self-insurance through higher mortgage costs, it appears
that any action initiated by individual mortgage originators may run the risk of
violating the fair lending acts recently enacted by certain states.
To illustrate the dilemma created by the socially beneficial prohibition of
mortgage lending discrimination leading to the socially undesirable result of
encouraging homebuyers to purchase houses in environmentally hazardous
areas, it is useful to examine the case of surface fault rupture zones in California.

SURFACE FAULT RUPTURE ZONES
Information about the location of surface fault rupture zones is provided to
prospective homebuyers by real estate agents in California under the provisions
of the Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zones Act (Cal. Pub. Res. C ode #262Iff.
(West 1982 Supp.)). This legislation, originally passed in 1972 following the
destructive San Fernando earthquake of February 1981, was intended to prevent
new large-scale development in areas particularly subject to surface fault rupture.
The state geologist was directed to delineate, by December 31, 1973,
"appropriately wide special studies zones to encompass all potentially and
recently active traces of the San Andreas, Calaveras, Hayward, and San Jacinto
Faults," as well as other faults which were "a potential hazard to structures
from surface faulting or fault creep" (Cai. Pub. Res. Code #2622 (West 1982
Supp.)). A 1975 amendment to the Act mandated disclosure of these zones by
the real estate agent: "A person who is acting as an agent for a seller of real
property which is located within a delineated special studies zone, or the seller
if he is acting without an agent, shall disclose to any prospective purchaser the
fact that the property is located within a delineated special studies zone" (Cai.
Pub. Res. Code #2621.9 (West 1982 Supp.)).
Despite the existence of this disclosure legislation, there is little awareness
by purchasers of the meaning of location in the zones. A 1979 survey of recent
homebuyers showed that homebuyers who had recently received the disclosure
were no more likely to be aware of the existence of these zones, or the fact that
their houses lay within them, than homebuyers outside the zones [7]. In
addition, the majority of homebuyers surveyed within the zones could not
remember that a disclosure has taken place. Among the possible explanations
for these lapses of memory is the disclosure method used by the real estate
agents—disclosure takes place at the least sensitive time in the sales transaction
and conveys a minimal amount of information about the meaning of the special
studies zones. Moreover, the name "special studies zone" in itself is not
particularly evocative of surface fault rupture.
This survey also found that a primary motivation for the selection of house
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and neighborhood was economic—the probability that with a minimum
investment, potential resale value would be maximized. Since recent experience
shows that investment in houses within the zones does not impair the anticipated
economic return, homebuyers can ignore with impunity the warning that they
are within a surface fault rupture zone, at least in the context of probable profit
on resale. The study concluded that "unless environmental hazards become
translated into economic risks to individuals, hazard warnings not followed by
severe disasters will probably not be heeded, and homebuyers will continue to
purchase housing in areas susceptible to natural disasters regardless of the timing
or form of the warning." [7, p. 97]
If society values the protection of life and property through the avoidance of
exposure to specified natural hazards such as surface fault rupture or fault
creep, then some modification is required in the present system of property
transactions. This modification could involve draconian land-use regulations, or
could involve self-correcting mechanisms within the free enterprise system.
Lenders who have a long-term property interest in the real estate securing a loan,
for instance, might include a requirement that homebuyers purchase earthquake
insurance policies or that higher interest rates be charged for loans made on
properties within surface fault rupture hazard areas. Would such actions be
feasible and legal?

THE IMPACTS OF FINANCIAL DISCRIMINATION ACTS
ON GEOLOGICALLY BASED LENDING POLICY
California state law prohibits lending institutions from denying home loans
or discriminating in setting the terms or conditions of such loans, if the denial
or discrimination is based on "conditions, characteristics, or trends in the
neighborhood, or geographic area" in which the property is located "unless the
financial institution can demonstrate that such consideration in a particular
case is required to avoid an unsafe and unsound business practice" (Cal. Admin.
Code tit. 21, R. 7105(a) (1) (D) (1979)).
The issue at hand is whether the avoidance of surface fault rupture zones can
be equated with avoiding "an unsafe and unsound business practice." The
California Administrative Code is quite specific in setting out the parameters of
institutional discretion. Lenders can consider neighborhood characteristics if
they can demonstrate that "one or more factors relating to the geographic area
closely surrounding the security property are likely to cause the fair market
value of the security property to decrease during the early (3-5) years of the
mortgage term" (Cal. Admin. Code tit. 21, R. 7106 (B) (1) (1979)). In this
determination, the lender is permitted to consider "both natural and other
hazardous conditions surrounding the security property" (id!, R. 7106 (b) (2).
What is prohibited is "unfounded and unsubstantial assumptions regarding the
effect upon loan risk of the physical or economic characteristics of a neighborhood
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or geographic area" (Cal. Admin. Code tit. 21, R. 7106(a) (1979)). The burden
is on the lending institution to show the need for taking neighborhood
characteristics into consideration in setting the terms and conditions of home loans.
Although the law does not require lenders to approve mortage loan
applications if the property is susceptible to damage within the first five years
of the mortgage term, or if there is an imminent threat to the health and safety
of the loan applicant were this person to inhabit a particular dwelling (Cal.
Health & Safety Code #35813 (West 1982 Supp.)), it would seem that location
within a special studies zone is not per se sufficient ground for a loan refusal
or the modification of its terms. Since seismologists are not presently able to
make precise predictions about the timing and extent of damage associated with
surface faulting, it would not be possible for a lender to demonstrate that there
would be a necessary decline in value of a property located within a fault rupture
zone. Even where the location of the fault is precisely known, a dwelling unit is
located astride the fault trace, and a reasonable certainty could be assigned to
the occurrence of a major damaging earthquake over a twenty to thirty year
period, no precise statements about the likely damage over the very short term
(3-5 years) can be supported with scientific evidence. It must be concluded
therefore that current California law, intended to assure access to mortgage
credit by persons formerly subject to discriminatory lending practices, has the
unintended effect of guaranteeing that property susceptible to damage within
the thirty-year life of the mortgage must still get access to mortgage financing
on the same terms as property not so situated. Modification of lending terms,
such as the requirement of earthquake insurance or the imposition of additional
loan costs, would not seem to be permitted under the stringent requirements of
this state's Housing Financial Discrimination Act.

THE ASSOCIATION OF SURFACE FAULT
RUPTURE ZONES WITH ETHNIC
RESIDENTIAL CONCENTRATIONS
A very important question in the evaluation of the dual impacts of singlepurpose legislation is whether home mortgage discrimination against neighbor
hoods within surface fault rupture zones would incidentally entail discrimination
against neighborhoods containing substantial numbers of racial and ethnic
minorities. This answer to this question is somewhat complex.
In order to estimate the population and housing composition of the special
studies zones, census tract boundaries were matched with the boundaries of a
special studies zone. The entire population of a tract crossed by a special studies
zone was considered "within the zone," unless the major population center of
the tract lay outside the zone. The most serious problem of this method is that
of over-estimation and possible bias in calculations.
Census tracts were aggregated into fourteen special studies zones. All of the
special studies zones within the major metropolitan areas of California were
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analyzed, including zones in Los Angeles, Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove,
San Bernardino-Riverside, San Francisco-Oakland, San Jose, and Santa Rosa.
Census tract data on twenty-one variables summarizing age, family status,
occupational status, income, and housing tenure were compiled based on the
1979 Census of Population. A mean for each variable was calculated for each
special studies zone, and the data were further aggregated so that the median
value for the composite of special studies zones could be calculated for each
variable (Table 1).
The composite figures for all of the zones showed that people living in the
zones were slightly more wealthy than for the state as a whole, with fewer
blacks, fewer persons over age seventy-five and fewer households headed by
females. Housing was more likely to be owner-occupied and built after 1939.
Thus, the zones did not-contain a disproportionate share of blacks, elderly or
poor people in 1970.
For the individual lender these figures may be deceptive. The Compton fault
was 95.8 percent black in 1970, and the Calaveras fault zone, as represented by
Gilroy, was 56.6 percent Spanish-speaking. In addition, the median value of
housing in these areas as well as in the San Andreas-Desert communities, the
San Jacinto fault zone, and the Antioch fault zone fell well below the average
for the state.
In other areas, however, lenders could be confident that lending policies
related to surface fault rupture zonation would not disadvantage racial or
ethnic minorities, the elderly, or the poor. In special studies zones such as
Raymond Hill, San Andre.s-South San Francisco-Los Gatos, Green Valley, and
Rogers Creek-Heraldsburg, lenders could consider location with respect to the
fault zone in mortgage loan evaluations with no concern that such areas would
contain large numbers of disadvantaged or minority populations.

THE DILEMMA
Previous studies have demonstrated quite clearly that there is need for
legislative intervention in the home mortgage lending process to ensure that
racial or ethnic minorities receive the same access to mortgage credit as the
majority population. In a detailed study based on census tract-zip code data
gathered by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board survey of Chicago (1973), and
on individual loan applications based on the Comptroller of the Currency's Fair
Housing Lending Practices Survey (1971), Listokin and Casey found that race
had a strong independent effect on lending behavior [8]. The Chicago study
showed that the racial composition of the neighborhood had an independent
effect on the volume of loans in the neighborhood, and the micro-level data
showed that race of the mortgage loan applicant had an effect on the decision to
accept or reject the toan application, even after controlling for economic
characteristics of the borrowers. These two analyses indicate the need for some
regulation of mortgage lending policy to ensure equitable treatment of minorities.
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The dilemma is that regulation of mortgage lending policy, with the intent
of preventing racial discrimination, may also be interpreted as proscribing
geologic discrimination. The latter interpretation may occur despite the fact
that special studies zones (fault rupture zones) in California do not, taken as
a group, contain a systematic concentration of black, Spanish-speaking, or low
income population. If California law were modified to permit discrimination
in mortgage lending on the basis of the location with respect to a surface fault
trace, in most fault zones it would not be the minority or low income population
which would primarily be impacted.
Whether the remedy be the lender's capability to adjust the terms of the
loan, or mandatory earthquake insurance, California law needs to be revised to
ease the burden for the lender of demonstrating that investment in properties in
fault rupture zones constitutes an "unsafe or unsound business practice." The
California Housing Financial Discrimination Act of 1977, as presently worded,
at the very least discourages mortgage lenders from taking actions which could
benefit both themselves and homebuyers, economically and environmentally.
Mortgage lending in surface fault zones should be discouraged, and earthquake
insurance should be required for those persons who choose to live in such areas.
This can be done in a way which retains the law's laudable policy of avoiding
racial discrimination, without the unintentional effect of limiting the possibilities
of a geologically based lending policy. A clarification of the wording of the
Housing Financial Discrimination Act would help to alleviate some of the present
potentially disastrous effects of failing to discourage residential investment in
surface fault rupture zones.
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